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a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme a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growth in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. We
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high and the size of pension benefits under a defined-benefit scheme is rel-
atively large, PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme to a
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ect of popu-
lation aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate or an increase
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries that employ pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems
maintain elderly living standards by adjusting pension benefits to maintain the
ratio of pensions to average wages of working generations at a constant value
(i.e., wage indexation). Under this type of defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme,
declining birth rates and aging populations have necessitated increases in the pen-
sion contributions of younger generations. However, because of the rapid pace at
which populations are aging, the conventional approach (i.e., increasing contribu-
tions to maintain pension benefit levels) imposes an excessive social security tax
burden on younger generations and endangers the sustainability of PAYG pension
systems.
Faced with these challenges, policy makers in several developed countries
have abandoned the traditional practice of continuously increasing contributions.
Instead, they employ a demographically modified indexation program. Under a
demographically modified indexation program, if the number of workers support-
ing the pension system decreases, then the wage indexation rate for pension bene-
fits also decreases even if the average wages of the working generations increase.
Hence, elderly pensions are adjusted automatically based on changes in demo-
graphic conditions. The introduction of a demographically modified indexation
program paves the way to a cap on future contribution increases or to a fixed-
contribution PAYG pension scheme. For example, the 2004 pension reform in
Japan moved away from the standard practice of increasing employee pension
contributions to guarantee a 59% benefit level and instead capped future contribu-
tions at 18.3% (i.e., a fixed-contribution program). In addition, Japan introduced
a demographically modified indexation program to ensure that the size of pension
benefits was consistent with the new contribution cap.1 Today, many other OECD
countries are introducing automatic pension benefit adjustment mechanisms and
modified indexation systems to prevent unrestricted future contribution increases.2
From a theoretical perspective, these recent PAYG pension reforms signify a tran-
sition from defined-benefit schemes to defined-contribution schemes.
This paper develops a two-period OLG model of endogenous growth with a
PAYG pension scheme and examines how PAYG pension reform from a defined-
benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects economic growth. We
show that in economies in which the old-age dependency ratio is relatively high
and the size of pensions under a defined benefit scheme is relatively large, PAYG
1The new pension level established by the 2004 pension reform was 50%. For more informa-
tion regarding the 2004 pension reform in Japan, see, for example, Komamura (2004).
2For example, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea and Turkey each have linked future
increases in pension ages to changes in life expectancy. In addition, Sweden introduced a defined-
contribution PAYG pension scheme in 1999. See OECD (2013) for additional details.
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pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme
positively aects economic growth. Furthermore, we consider how PAYG pension
reform from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects
the relationship between population aging and economic growth. We show that
in economies in which the old-age dependency ratio is relatively high and the
size of pensions under a defined benefit scheme is relatively large, this type of
pension reform mitigates the negative growth eect of population aging caused
by a decline in the population growth rate or by an increase in life expectancy.
This paper is related to the vast body of literature that examines the eects
of population aging on the sustainability of a PAYG pension system and on eco-
nomic growth. Relevant studies include those by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997),
Wigger (1999), Yakita (2001), Zhang et al. (2001, 2003, 2005), Gradstein and
Kaganovich (2004) and, more recently, Fanti and Gori (2012) and Cipriani (2014).
Using various stylized models with dierent engines of growth, these studies rig-
orously examine how economic growth is aected by changes in the size of PAYG
pensions (e.g., Wigger, 1999), by the transition from an unfunded to a funded pen-
sion system (e.g., Pecchenino and Pollard, 1997), and by population aging (e.g.,
Yakita, 2001; Zhang et al., 2001, 2003, 2005). Furthermore, Fanti and Gori (2012)
and Cipriani (2014) debate the eects of population aging on the sustainability of
PAYG pension systems. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are few
theoretical studies that examine the impact of a transition from a defined-benefit
scheme to a defined-contribution scheme on economic growth, despite the fact that
this type of PAYG pension reform has recently become common among OECD
countries. Thus, this paper seeks to fill the gap between theoretical research and
policy debates in the political arena.
During the course of writing this paper, I found one exceptional study by Ar-
tige et al. (2014) that compares the respective macroeconomic performances of
a defined-benefit scheme and a defined-contribution scheme in an aging society.3
Using a two-period OLG model of neoclassical growth with general utility and
production functions, Artige et al. (2014) study how a decline in the fertility
rate and an increase in longevity aect capital accumulation and welfare under
dierent PAYG pension schemes. Artige et al. (2014) find that the eect of a
decline in the fertility rate or an increase in longevity on capital accumulation is
always positive under a defined-contribution scheme, whereas the eect is am-
biguous under a defined-benefit scheme. Then, they show that if two economies
are initially dynamically ecient and are identical in all respects except pension
schemes, the result of identical declines in fertility rates and identical increases
in longevity is that the welfare level of the defined-benefit economy is lower than
that of the defined-contribution economy. In Artige et al. (2014), the descrip-
3I am grateful that one of the referees apprised me of this related work.
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tion of these two economies as initially identical means that the initial size of
PAYG pensions or the demographic conditions in each of the two economies are
adjusted to ensure that all initial endogenous economic outcomes are identical.
Based on the theoretical results, Artige et al. (2014) conclude that in an aging
society, the defined-contribution scheme dominates the defined-benefit scheme in
terms of both income per capita and welfare.
Given that Artige et al. (2014) oer a comprehensive analysis with general
utility and production functions, there are many common research themes and
theoretical implications between the present study and the study of Artige et al.
(2014). However, this paper provides several original contributions that comple-
ment the analysis of Artige et al. (2014) and diers from Artige et al. (2014) in
at least the two respects. First, to facilitate the comparison of our results with the
results obtained in previous studies on population aging and growth, we develop a
two-period OLG model of endogenous growth a` la Romer (1986). Studies such as
Yakita (2001), Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) and Zhang et al. (2001, 2003b,
2005), among others, examine how population aging caused by a decline in the
fertility rate or an increase in longevity aects economic growth in an OLG model
of endogenous growth with social security. In particular, Tabata (2005), Ito and
Tabata (2008) and Mizushima (2009) propose various growth models that explain
the empirically observed hump-shaped relationship between the old-age depen-
dency ratio and economic growth; these growth models emphasize the design of
the social security system.4 However, to the best of our knowledge, no study to
date has examined how the transition from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-
contribution scheme aects existing theoretical predictions regarding the eect of
population aging on growth. Therefore, this paper provides new insight into the
relationship between population aging and economic growth.
Second, this paper focuses on the role of wage indexation of pension pay-
ments and proposes a tractable PAYG pension scheme that possesses both defined-
benefit and defined-contribution aspects (i.e., a mixed payment scheme).5 With
4Recent empirical studies by An and Joen (2006) and Prskawetz et al.(2007) suggest a non-
monotonic relationship between population aging and economic growth. Using panel data from
OECD countries during the period 1960-2000, An and Joen (2006) demonstrate a hump-shaped
relationship between the old-age dependency ratio and economic growth. Furthermore, using data
from EU-15 countries for the period 1900-2005, Prskawetz et al. (2007) find that an increase in
the working-age population (ages 50-64) positively contributes to economic growth, whereas a
large old-age population and a large young-age population each has a negative eect on economic
growth. Recent theoretical studies (e.g., de la Croix and Licandro, 1999; Boucekkine et al., 2002;
Miyazawa, 2006; and Kunze, 2014) attempt to explain the observed non-monotonic relationship
between population aging and economic growth.
5Artige et al. (2014) employ a lump-sum tax and a lump-sum pension payment and only
compare a pure defined-contribution scheme to a pure defined-benefit scheme. A wage indexation
specification might be more realistic and plausible in the context of a growing economy.
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the introduction of demographically modified indexation programs, PAYG pen-
sion schemes in many OECD countries possess both defined-benefit and defined-
contribution attributes. Our simple formulation of a PAYG pension scheme en-
ables us to capture these features of recent PAYG pension schemes in a reduced-
form manner. Moreover, combined with our log-utility specifications, this formu-
lation enables us to clarify the economic preconditions under which the transition
from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme will positively
(negatively) aect capital accumulation and economic growth.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic model.
Section 3 discusses the impact of PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit
scheme to a defined-contribution scheme on existing theoretical predictions re-
garding the eect of population aging on growth. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model with PAYG pensions.
In each period, L individuals are born, and each individual is endowed with one
unit of labor. The population grows at the constant rate n 2 ( 1;1). Individuals
live for a maximum of two periods (youth and old age). An individual dies at the
beginning of old age with a probability of 1   p and lives through old age with
a probability of p 2 (0; 1]. In each period t, there exists only two generations:
the active working young and the retired old. Therefore, the old-age dependency
ratio (i.e., the ratio of old dependents to the young working population) in period
t is given by pLt 1Lt =
p
1+n . Thus, population aging is triggered if there is either
a decrease in the population growth rate n or an increase in the old-age survival
probability p.
2.1 Agents
Each individual derives utility from his or her own consumption in both youth and
old age. Thus, the lifetime expected utility of an individual born at period t is
expressed as
ut = ln ct + p ln dt+1; (1)
where ct is consumption in youth and dt+1 is consumption in old age. As in Yakita
(2001) and Cipriani (2014), the instantaneous utility function is assumed to be
logarithmic for the sake of tractability.
In youth, each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor, earns wage
income wt, and allocates wt to his or her own current consumption ct, saving st
and the payment of social security taxes twt. Following Blanchard (1985), we
assume the existence of an actuarially fair insurance for the sake of simplicity.
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The insurance company promises each individual a payment Rt+1p st in exchange
for which the individual’s estate st accrues to the company, where p is the average
survival probability and Rt+1 is the gross rate of interest. In old age, survivors
retire and consume their returns on private annuities Rt+1p st and pension benefits
bt+1.
Thus, the lifetime budget constraints are
ct + st = (1   t)wt; (2)
dt+1 =
Rt+1
p
st + bt+1: (3)
By maximizing (1), subject to (2) and (3), we obtain
st =
p
1 + p
[(1   t)wt   bt+1Rt+1 ]: (4)
This savings equation states that a higher old-age survival probability p implies
higher savings, whereas both higher pension benefits bt+1 and higher tax rates t
imply lower savings.
2.2 Production
Each firm has constant returns-to-scale technology, and the aggregate production
function is expressed as Yt = F(Kt; AtLt), where Yt, Kt, and Lt denote the aggregate
levels of output, physical capital, and labor input, respectively. At represents labor
productivity, which is assumed to be driven by a positive spillover from the size of
aggregate capital stock to the productivity of workers in the manner suggested by
Romer (1986). To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, as in Grossman
and Yanagawa (1993), it is assumed that At takes the following form: At = 1a KtLt =
kt
a
, where kt = Kt=Lt and a is a positive technological parameter. Representing the
production function in eective per capita terms, yˆt = f ( ˆkt), where yˆt = Yt=AtLt,
ˆkt = Kt=AtLt, we obtain the optimal condition for a representative firm as follows:
Rt = 1 + f 0(a)    = R, wt = [ f (a)  f 0(a)aa ]kt = w¯kt. The interest rate and the wage
rate per labor in eciency units are constant over time.
To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of the existing literature
on population aging and growth, we adopt a simple Romer-type spillover spec-
ification that generates an AK-type endogenous growth path without transition.
Although this simplification clearly restricts the scope of our analysis, it yields
intuitive and manageable results.
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2.3 Government
In this economy, the government pursues a social security policy based on a PAYG
pension system with a defined-benefit scheme. Let us assume that the government
balances its budget in each period and faces the following budget constraints:
twtLt = bt pLt 1: (5)
To formulate the transition from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution
scheme in the simplest manner, we focus on the role of wage indexation. More
specifically, the pension payment for old agents in generation t   1, bt, is adjusted
according to changes in the next generation’s wages wt:
bt = [
Lt
pLt 1
 + (1   )]wt = [1 + np  + (1   )]wt; (6)
where 1+np  + (1   ) denotes the replacement ratio for the next generation’s
wages wt. The replacement ratio is defined as a linear combination of a demo-
graphic adjustment component (i.e., 1+np  ) and a fixed coecient component (i.e.,
). The index  2 [0; 1] measures the weight given to the demographic adjust-
ment component. A demographic adjustment component (i.e., 1+np  ) character-
izes a demographically modified indexation in which the wage indexation rate
for pension benefits decreases automatically as the size of the old-age population
increases relative to the size of the working population. In addition, the index
 2 [0; 1) measures the size of pension payments in the demographic adjustment
component, whereas  2 [0; 1) measures the size of pension payments in the fixed
coecient component.
Given (6), suppose that  = 0, the per capita pension benefit of generation
t   1, is given simply by bt = wt and that the wage replacement ratio is a fixed
constant at  2 [0; 1) irrespective of the value of the old-age dependency ratio
p
1+n . In this case, the PAYG pension scheme is characterized by a pure defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1). Next, suppose  = 1,
the per capita pension benefit of generation t   1, is fully adjusted in response
to changes in demographic conditions and satisfies the following equality condi-
tion:  wtLt = bt pLt 1. This equality condition is the well-known formulation of
government budget constraints under a pure defined-contribution scheme. There-
fore, in this case, the PAYG pension scheme is characterized by a pure defined-
contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1). Finally, suppose
 2 (0; 1). In this case, the PAYG pension scheme is characterized by a linear
combination of a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1)
and a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1). We
refer to this type of pension system as a mixed payment scheme. Under a mixed
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payment scheme, as the value of  approaches 1, the weight given to the defined-
contribution component increases. Therefore, the transition from a defined-benefit
scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) is described simply by the increase in the
value of  from 0 to 1.
As explained in the Introduction, as many OECD countries implement demo-
graphically modified indexation programs, their PAYG pension systems possess
both defined-benefit and defined-contribution components. Our simple specifica-
tion enables us to capture this combination of attributes in a reduced-form man-
ner.6
By dierentiating (6) with respect to , we obtain
@bt
@
8>><>>: 0, for p1+n    ;> 0, for p1+n <   : (7)
Giving a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component implies a lower
(resp. higher) per capita pension benefit when (i) the old-age dependency ratio
p
1+n is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the fixed contribution rate  under a defined-
contribution scheme is relatively small (resp. large); or (iii) the fixed replacement
ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large (resp. small) to satisfy
p
1+n >
 

(resp. p1+n <   ).
From equations (5) and (6), the social security tax rate is given by
t =  =  + (1   ) p1 + n  (n; p; ): (8)
The social security tax rate  depends on the values of the old-age survival prob-
ability p, the population growth rate n and the weight  given to the defined-
contribution component. To emphasize these relationships, we describe  as (n; p; ).
Because  2 (0; 1), the parameter condition  + (1 ) p1+n < 1 must hold. Based
on (8), when  = 1 (i.e., a pure defined-contribution scheme), the social security
tax rate is given by t =  and is constant regardless of the value of the old-
age dependency ratio p1+n . However, when  2 [0; 1) (i.e., a pure defined-benefit
scheme or a mixed payment scheme), the social security tax rate increases with
the old-age dependency ratio p1+n due to the eects of demographically modified
indexation.
By dierentiating (8) with respect to , we obtain
@
@
8>><>>: 0, for p1+n    ;> 0, for p1+n <   : (9)
6Of course, our mixed payment scheme is rather abstract and cannot capture the very com-
plicated structures of recent PAYG pension systems in their entirety. Nevertheless, this simple
framework enables us to capture several realistic features of recent pension reforms.
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Giving a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component implies a lower
(resp. higher) social security tax rate when (i) the old-age dependency ratio p1+n
is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the fixed contribution rate  under a defined-
contribution scheme is relatively small (resp. large); or (iii) the fixed replacement
ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large (resp. small) to satisfy
p
1+n >
 

(resp. p1+n <   ).
Equations (7) and (9) indicate that in economies in which the old-age depen-
dency ratio is relatively high and the size of pension benefits under a defined-
benefit scheme is relatively large, the transition from a defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme with
a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) leads to a lower per capita pension benefit as
well as a lower social security tax rate. (6) indicates that the social security tax rate
increases monotonically with the old-age dependency ratio under a pure defined-
benefit scheme but remains constant under a pure defined-contribution scheme.
Therefore, when the old-age dependency ratio is relatively high and the size of
pension payments under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large, the transi-
tion from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme negatively
aects the overall size of PAYG pension.
2.4 Dynamics
The market-clearing condition for capital is given by Kt+1 = stLt or kt+1 = st1+n . Us-
ing (8), the per capita pension benefit bt in (6) is rewritten as bt = 1+np (n; p; )wt.
By substituting (4), (8), bt+1 = 1+np (n; p; )wt+1, Rt = R and wt = w¯kt into
kt+1 = st1+n , the gross per capita output growth rate G in this economy is described
by
kt+1
kt
=
p
1 + n
1   (n; p; )
[1 + p + (n; p; ) w¯R ]
w¯  G(n; p; ): (10)
We assume that G > 1, as in the literature on endogenous growth.7 From (10),
the gross per capita output growth rate G depends on the values of the old age
survival probability p, the population growth rate n and the weight  given to the
component of a defined-contribution scheme. To stress these relationships, we
describe G as G(n; p; ).
7When f (ˆk)  ˆk f 0(ˆk) is concave, the relationship G > 1 always holds under a suciently small
value of a because the relationships @w¯
@a
< 0 and @R
@a
< 0 hold.
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3 PAYG pension reform
Our purpose in this paper is to examine how the transition from a defined-benefit
scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects economic growth. We also con-
sider the impact of such a transition on existing theoretical predictions regarding
the eect of population aging on economic growth. These issues are rigorously
investigated in this section.
3.1 PAYG pension reform and growth
In this subsection, we examine how the transition from a defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme with a
fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects economic growth. In this paper, this type
of pension reform is described by the increased weight  given to the defined-
contribution component. Because @G
@
< 0 from (10), and considering the results
of (9), by dierentiating (10) with respect to , we obtain
@G
@
=
@G
@
@
@
8>><>>: 0, for p1+n    ; ;< 0, for p1+n <   : (11)
Equation (11) indicates that an increase in the weight  given to the defined-
contribution component positively (resp. negatively) aects economic growth
when (i) the old-age dependency ratio p1+n is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the
fixed contribution rate  under a defined-contribution scheme is relatively small
(resp. large) or (iii) the fixed replacement ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme
is relatively large (resp. small) to satisfy p1+n >   (resp. p1+n <   ).
Based on (7) and (9), when the condition p1+n >   (resp. p1+n <   ) holds, an
increase in the weight  given to the defined-contribution component negatively
(resp. positively) aects both the per capita pension benefits and the social secu-
rity tax rate. According to (4), the lower (resp. higher) social security tax rate t
and per capita pension benefits bt+1 motivate young individuals to save more (resp.
less) for their old age, which positively (resp. negatively) aects capital accumu-
lation and economic growth. These results suggest that in economies in which the
old-age dependency ratio is relatively high and the size of pension benefits under
a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large, the transition from a defined-benefit
scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) negatively aects the overall size of PAYG
pension and thus positively aects economic growth.
In our simple model, as inferred from (10), any policy that reduces the size of
PAYG pension leads to higher rates of capital accumulation and economic growth.
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Therefore, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the fixed contribution rate  or fixed re-
placement ratio  positively aects economic growth. Unlike these straightfor-
ward pension reduction policies, as inferred from (10), the eect of a transition
from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme on the overall
size of PAYG pension and economic growth depends on the extent of population
aging. These features suggest that this type of PAYG pension reform may have
a non-trivial impact on the relationship between population aging and economic
growth. The following subsection investigates this issue more rigorously.
3.2 PAYG pension reform, population aging and growth
In this subsection, we examine how the transition from a defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme with a
fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects the existing theoretical predictions regard-
ing the eect of population aging on economic growth. In this paper, population
aging is triggered by either a decline in the population growth rate n or an in-
crease in the old-age survival probability p. Let us first consider the growth eect
of population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate. Based on
(10), which concerns the eect of the population growth rate n on gross per capita
output growth G, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 .
1. Suppose that a PAYG pension is financed by a pure defined-benefit scheme
(i.e.,  = 0) or a mixed payment scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)); then, there exists a
unique nˆ 2 ( [1   p(1 )1  ];1) such that G(nˆ; p; ) > G(n; p; ) 8n 2 ( [1  
p(1 )
1  ];1), @G(n;p;)@n > 0 8n 2 ( [1   p(1 )1  ]; nˆ), @G(n;p;)@n < 0 8n 2 (nˆ;1).
2. Suppose that a PAYG pension is financed by a pure defined-contribution
scheme (i.e.,  = 1); then G(n; p; 1) satisfies @G(n;p;1)
@n
< 0 8n 2 ( 1;1).
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A. Proposition 1 indicates that
when a PAYG pension is financed by a pure defined-benefit scheme (i.e.,  = 0) or
a mixed payment scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)), there is a hump-shaped relationship be-
tween the population growth rate and the per capita output growth rate. However,
when a PAYG pension is financed by a pure defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,
 = 1), the relationship between the population growth rate and the per capita out-
put growth rate is always negative. The existence of a hump-shaped relationship
between population growth and per capita output growth under a pure defined-
benefit scheme has been recognized in the existing literature on population aging
and growth (e.g., Ito and Tabata, 2008). This paper confirms that an analogous
prediction holds under a mixed payment scheme.
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Figure 1 shows numerical examples of the relationship between population
growth and per capita output growth under alternative weight values  given to
the defined-contribution component (i.e.,  = 0, 0:3, 0:6 and 1). In the simulation,
we assume that the production function is given by Yt = (Kt)(AtLt)1 . The
parameters used in the baseline simulations are given as follows:  = 0:3, p =
0:75, 1 + n = 0:75,  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 1 and a = 0:02.8 Note that the objective
of these numerical examples is not to calibrate our simple model to actual data
but to supplement the qualitative results. The quantitative results obtained in this
paper should be interpreted with caution. Consistent with Proposition 1, when
 2 [0; 1) (i.e., under a pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed payment scheme),
there is a hump-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the
per capita output growth rate. However, when  = 1 (i.e., under a pure defined-
contribution scheme), the per capita output growth rate increases monotonically
as the population growth rate declines.
Equation (10) implies that a decline in the population growth rate n exerts
two competing influences on capital accumulation. Under a pure defined-benefit
scheme (i.e.,  = 0) or a mixed payment scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)), a decline in
the population growth rate n increases the old-age dependency ratio p1+n , which
positively aects the social security tax rate . This higher social security tax rate
 leads to a lower rate of saving by young individuals, which negatively aects
capital accumulation. We denote this negative eect of a decline in n on capi-
tal accumulation as the “tax burden eect”. Under a pure defined-contribution
scheme (i.e.,  = 1), however, the social security tax rate is fixed at  irrespec-
tive of the value of the old-age dependency ratio. Therefore, the negative growth
eect of a decline in n due to the tax burden eect does not exist under a pure
defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1). Conversely, a decline in the popula-
tion growth rate n mitigates the dilution of savings st1+n and thus positively aects
capital accumulation. We denote this positive eect of a decline in n on capital
accumulation as the “anti-dilution eect”. The positive growth eect of a decline
in n because of the anti-dilution eect always exists irrespective of the design of
the pension scheme. Therefore, a decline in the population growth rate always in-
creases the per capita output growth rate under a pure defined-contribution scheme
8Based on estimates of the capital labor share, we set the value of  as 0.3. The life tables
for the United States developed by Bell (1992) indicate that in 2000, the probability of a man
surviving to age 65 (conditional on his reaching age 15) is 0.79. Thus, the benchmark value of
old-age survival probability p is set to 0.75. In addition, to achieve a TFR of 1.5 per couple, the
value of the gross population growth rate 1+n is set to 0.75. To achieve a 50 % benefit level under
a pure defined-benefit scheme, the value of the fixed replacement ratio  is set to 0.5. Analogously,
to achieve a 50% fixed contribution rate under a pure defined-contribution scheme, the value of
the fixed contribution rate  is set to 0.5. Finally, to achieve a 2% per capita GDP growth rate at
benchmark values, the value of a was adjusted to 0:02.
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(i.e.,  = 1).
Based on (10), it is easy to guess that the eect of decreasing n is likely to
be negative under a pure defined-benefit scheme (i.e.,  = 0) or a mixed payment
scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)), when n is extremely small (i.e., n !  1). Because
the ratio of old to young people is large, the positive anti-dilution eect becomes
negligible. However, because the social security tax rate is high due to the high
dependency ratio, any increase in the social security tax burden stemming from
a decline in the population growth rate n causes a considerable negative impact
on capital accumulation. Therefore, when n is extremely small, the negative tax
burden eect is likely to dominate the positive anti-dilution eect. Conversely, the
eect of decreasing n is likely to be positive when n is extremely large (i.e., n !
1). Because the ratio of old to young in the population is small, the positive anti-
dilution eect becomes more serious. However, because the social security tax
rate is low due to the low dependency ratio, the negative tax burden eect becomes
negligible. Therefore, when n is extremely large, the positive anti-dilution eect
is likely to dominate the negative tax burden eect.
Figure 1 also shows how the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects the relationship between the
population growth rate and the per capita output growth rate. As discussed in
Section 3.1, this type of PAYG pension reform positively (resp. negatively) aects
economic growth when p1+n >
 

(resp. p1+n <   ), or 1 + n < p (resp. 1 + n > p ).
From (8), the overall social security tax rates remain the same regardless of the
value of  when 1+n = p
 
. Therefore, based on (10), the per capita output growth
rate remains the same regardless of the value of  when 1 + n = p
 
, as shown in
Figure 1. However, (10) also means that when 1 + n < p
 
(resp. 1 + n > p
 
),
the overall social security tax rate decreases (resp. increases) with the value of .
Therefore, the per capita output growth rate increases (resp. decreases) with the
value of .
These results suggest that in economies in which the population growth rate
is relatively low and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is rel-
atively large to satisfy 1 + n < p
 
, the transition from a pure defined-benefit
scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) mitigates or overcomes the
negative growth eect of population aging caused by a decline in the population
growth rate.9 The intuitions are explained as follows. Under (8), giving a larger
9In economies in which the population growth rate is relatively high and the size of pensions
under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively small to satisfy 1 + n < p
 
, the transition from a pure
defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) exerts two competing influences on the growth
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weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact of changes
in the old-age dependency ratio on the social security tax rate, which alleviates
the negative growth eect of a decline in n due to the tax burden eect. Fur-
thermore, when 1 + n < p
 
, (7) and (9) indicate that an increase in the weight 
of the defined-contribution component decreases the size of PAYG pensions and
increases savings, which strengthens the positive growth eect of a decline in n
due to the anti-dilution eect. These factors mitigate the negative growth eect
of population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate. Therefore,
in economies in which the population growth rate is relatively low and the size of
pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large to satisfy 1 + n < p
 
,
the transition from a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  to
a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  mitigates or even
overcomes the negative growth eect of population aging caused by a decline in
the population growth rate.
Analogous policy predictions hold when we consider population aging caused
by an increase in the old-age survival probability rate p. As demonstrated by the
numerical examples presented in Figure 2, under plausible parameter conditions,
when  2 [0; 1) (i.e., under a pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed payment
scheme), there is a hump-shaped relationship between old-age survival probability
and the per capita output growth rate.10 However, when  = 1 (i.e., under a
pure defined-contribution scheme), the per capita output growth rate increases
monotonically with the old-age survival probability rate.
Equation (10) implies that the old-age survival probability rate p exerts two
competing influences on capital accumulation. Under a pure defined-benefit scheme
(i.e.,  = 0) or a mixed payment scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)), an increase in the old-
age survival probability rate p increases the old-age dependency ratio p1+n , which
positively aects the social security tax rate . The higher social security tax rate
 leads to a lower rate of saving by young individuals, which negatively aects
capital accumulation. We denote this negative eect of p on capital accumula-
tion as the “tax burden eect”. Under a pure defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,
 = 1), however, the social security tax rate remains constant at  irrespective of
the value of the old-age dependency ratio. Therefore, the negative growth eect
eect of population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate. Based on (8), giving
a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact of a change in the
old-age dependency ratio on the social security tax rate, which alleviates the negative growth eect
of a decline in n due to the tax burden eect. However, when 1 + n > p
 
, (7) and (9) imply that
giving a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component leads to larger PAYG pensions and
smaller savings, which weakens the positive growth eect of a decline in n due to the anti-dilution
eect.
10The proof of this relationship is provided in Appendix C. Note that Appendix C is for the
referees’ information only and is not intended for publication).
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of p due to the tax burden eect does not exist under a pure defined-contribution
scheme (i.e.,  = 1). Conversely, the increase in old-age survival probability p
motivates young individuals to save more for old age, which positively aects
capital accumulation. We denote this positive eect of p on capital accumulation
as the “life-span eect”. The positive growth eect of p due to the life-span eect
always exists regardless of the type of pension scheme. Therefore, an increase in
life expectancy p always increases the per capita output growth rate under a pure
defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1).
Based on (10), it is easy to guess that the eect of increasing p is likely to
be negative under a pure defined-benefit scheme (i.e.,  = 0) or a mixed payment
scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)), when p is extremely large (i.e., p ! 1). Because the
old-age dependency ratio is high, the negative tax burden eect becomes more se-
rious. However, the marginal increase in the savings rate due to an increase in p is
low. Therefore, when p is extremely large, the negative tax burden eect is likely
to dominate the positive life-span eect. Conversely, the eect of increasing p is
likely to be positive when p is extremely small (i.e., p ! 0). Because the depen-
dency ratio is low, the negative tax burden eect becomes negligible. However,
the marginal increase in the savings rate due to an increase in p is high. Therefore,
when p is extremely small, the positive life-span eect is likely to dominate the
negative tax burden eect.
Figure 2 also shows how the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects the relationship between the
old-age survival probability rate and the per capita output growth rate. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.1, this type of PAYG pension reform positively (resp. neg-
atively) aects economic growth when p1+n >   (resp. p1+n <   ) or p >  (1+n)
(resp. p <  (1+n)

). Under (8), when p =  (1+n)

, the overall social security tax
rate remains the same regardless of the value of . Therefore, under (10), when
p =  (1+n)

, the per capita output growth rate remains the same irrespective of the
value of , as shown in Figure 2. However, (10) indicates that when p >  (1+n)

(resp. p <  (1+n)

), the overall social security tax rate decreases (resp. increases)
with the value of . Therefore, the per capita output growth rate increases (resp.
decreases) with the value of .
These results suggest that in economies in which the old-age survival probabil-
ity rate is relatively high and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme
is relatively large to satisfy p >  (1+n)

, the transition from a pure defined-benefit
scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) mitigates or overcomes the
negative growth eect of population aging caused by an increase in old-age sur-
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vival probability.11 The intuitions are explained as follows. Under (8), giving a
greater weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact of
changes in the social security tax rate caused by the old-age dependency ratio,
which alleviates the negative growth eect of p due to the tax burden eect. Fur-
ther, when p >  (1+n)

, (7) and (9) imply that an increase in the weight  given to
the defined-contribution component leads to smaller PAYG pensions and greater
savings, which strengthen the positive growth eect of p due to the life-span ef-
fect. These factors mitigate the negative growth eect of population aging caused
by an increase in old-age survival probability. Therefore, in economies in which
old-age survival probability is relatively high and the size of pensions under a
defined-benefit scheme is relatively large to satisfy p >  (1+n)

, the transition from
a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  to a defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  mitigates or even overcomes the negative
growth eect of population aging caused by an increase in life expectancy.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined how the transition from a defined-benefit PAYG pension
scheme to a defined-contribution PAYG pension scheme aects economic growth
in an OLG model with endogenous growth. We showed that in economies in
which the old-age dependency ratio is relatively high and the size of pensions
under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large, this type of pension reform
mitigates the negative growth eect of population aging that is caused by a decline
in the population growth rate or an increase in life expectancy.
Before concluding this paper, we must describe certain limitations of our anal-
ysis and briefly discuss directions for future research. First, we address the inter-
pretation of our numerical simulation results. The numerical simulation results
in Figures 1 and 2 appear to suggest that for economies in which the old-age
dependency ratio is suciently high (e.g., developed countries), the transition
from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme is beneficial for
11In economies in which old-age survival probability is relatively low and the size of pensions
under a defined-benefit scheme is relatively small to satisfy p <  (1+n)

, the transition from a pure
defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) exerts two competing influences on the growth
eect of population aging caused by an increase in old-age survival probability. According to (8),
an increase in the weight  given to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact of
changes in the social security tax rate caused by the old-age dependency ratio, which alleviates
the negative growth eect of p due to the tax burden eect. However, when p >  (1+n)

, (7) and
(9) imply that an increase in the weight  given to the defined-contribution component leads to
larger PAYG pensions and lower savings, which weakens the positive growth eect of p due to the
life-span eect.
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economic growth because it mitigates the negative growth eect of population
aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate or an increase in life
expectancy. However, as inferred from (11), whether the dependency ratio is suf-
ficiently “high” depends on the PAYG pension system parameters, namely, the
fixed contribution rate  under a defined-contribution scheme and the fixed re-
placement ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme. Therefore, the relative size of
pensions under dierent pension schemes is also relevant. However, it is dicult
to predict the true values of these pension parameters based on actual data because
the pension scheme specified in this paper is rather abstract. Moreover, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no reliable measure to assess the relative size or rela-
tive importance of a defined-contribution scheme. Although we confirm that the
qualitative results obtained based on Figures 1 and 2 hold for various combina-
tions of  and , our simulation results should be interpreted with caution when
formulating policy predictions.12
The second limitation, which is related to the first, is that the scope of this
paper is restricted to a simple, analytical and solvable version of an endogenous
growth model with rather abstract pension schemes and specified utility and pro-
duction functions. These simplifications enable us to obtain intuitive and manage-
able results. However, the application of our simple framework to assess the likely
impact of policy reform is obviously limited because our framework omits many
important pension scheme design details. For example, although policies that en-
force later retirement are commonly used to ensure the sustainability of PAYG
pension systems, retirement is not considered in our model. Therefore, the de-
velopment of a more elaborate numerical version of an endogenous growth model
that fully accounts for many important pension scheme design details and the con-
struction of a reliable measure to assess the relative size and relative importance
of a defined-benefit scheme are promising directions for future research.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Because the proof of Proposition 1-2 is self-evident, this Appendix provides only
the proof of Proposition 1-1. Let us denote the old-age dependency ratio by z 
p
1+n . Under (8) and (10), the gross per capita output growth rate G is rewritten as
G = z 1   (z; )[1 + p + (z; ) w¯R ]
w¯  G(z; );
 =  + (1   )z  (z; ):
12In Appendix B, we present numerical examples under dierent values of  and .
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Because  2 [0; 1), the old-age dependency ratio z must satisfy the following
conditions: z 2 (0; 1  (1 ) ). By dierentiating G(z; ) with respect to z, we obtain
1
G
@G
@z
=
1
z(1   )(1 + p +  w¯R )
h(z);
where
h(z)  [1      2(1   )z](1 + p) + f   [ + (1   )z]2gw¯
R
:
Note that h(z) satisfies the following properties: @h(z)
@z
< 0, limz!0 h(z) = (1  
 )(1 + p +  w¯R ) > 0, limz! 1  (1 ) h(z) =  (1    )(1 + p +
w¯
R ) < 0. Because
sign[@G
@z
] = sign[h(z)], the above relationships show that there is a unique zˆ 2
(0; 1  (1 ) ) such that G(zˆ; ) > G(z; ) 8z 2 (0; 1  (1 ) ), @G(z;)@z > 0 8z 2 (0; zˆ),
@G(z;)
@z
< 0 8z 2 (zˆ; 1  (1 ) ). Recalling that z  p1+n and sign[@G@n ] =  sign[@G@z ],
we can easily demonstrate that there is a unique nˆ 2 ( [1   p(1 )1  ];1) such that
G(nˆ; p; ) > G(n; p; ) 8n 2 ( [1  p(1 )1  ];1), @G(n;p;)@n > 0 8n 2 ( [1  p(1 )1  ]; nˆ),
@G(n;p;)
@n
< 0 8n 2 (nˆ;1).
Appendix B: Footnote 12
In this Appendix, we briefly examine the eects of dierent combinations of
PAYG pension parameters  and  on the numerical simulation results presented
in Figure 2, where  = 0:5 and  = 0:5 hold. To avoid unnecessary lexicographic
explanations, we provide only two intuitive examples. Figure 3 shows the case
in which  = 0:3 and  = 0:5 hold, whereas Figure 4 shows the case in which
 = 0:5 and  = 0:3 hold. The values of the other parameters are the same as
those in the baseline simulation case of Figure 2.
As discussed in Section 3-2, when 1 + n = p
 
, the per capita output growth
rate is the same regardless of the value of . However, when 1 + n < p
 
(resp.
1 + n > p
 
), the per capita output growth rate increases (resp. decreases) with the
value of . Because the value of p
 
in Figure 3 (resp. Figure 4) is smaller (resp.
larger) than the value of p
 
in Figure 2, the threshold value of the population
growth rate in Figure 3 becomes smaller (resp. larger) than the threshold value of
the population growth rate in Figure 2. Therefore, in Figure 3 (resp. Figure 4), the
range of parameter values of the population growth rate under which an increase
in  positively aects economic growth becomes smaller (resp. larger) relative to
Figure 2.
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Appendix C: Footnote 10 (This Appendix is for the
referees’ review only and is not intended for publica-
tion.)
By dierentiating G(z; ) with respect to p, noting that z  p1+n , we obtain
1 + n
G
@G
@p
=
1
z(1   )(1 + p +  w¯R )
q(p);
where
q(p)  [1      (1   )z(2 + p)] + f   [ + (1   )z]2g w¯
R
:
Note that q(p) satisfies the following properties: @q(p)
@p < 0, limp!0 q(p) = (1  
 )(1 +  w¯R ) > 0. Therefore, suppose the following parameter conditions hold:
q(1)  [1      (1   ) 3
1 + n
] + f   [ + (1   ) 
1 + n
]2g w¯
R
< 0:
Because sign[@G
@p ] = sign[q(p)], we can conclude that there is a unique pˆ 2 (0; 1)
such that G(n; pˆ; ) > G(n; p; ) 8p 2 (0; 1), @G(n;p;)
@p > 0 8p 2 (0; pˆ), @G(n;p;)@p < 08n 2 ( pˆ; 1). Intuitively, the parameter conditions to assure q(1) < 0 hold when the
population growth rate n is suciently small.
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Figure 1: Relationship between gross population growth 1 + n and economic
growth g under alternative values of  when 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Figure 2: Relationship between old age survival probability p and economic
growth g under alternative values of  when  = 0:5 and  = 0:523
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Figure 3: Relationship between gross population growth 1 + n and economic
growth g under alternative values of  when  = 0:3 and  = 0:524
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Figure 4: Relationship between gross population growth 1 + n and economic
growth g under alternative values of  when  = 0:5 and  = 0:325
